Strategic Divergence Between Washington and Tel Aviv in Managing the 2026 War: Regional Dimensions and Trajectories

Authors

DOI https://doi.org/10.56989/benkj.v6i7.1980

Keywords:

Strategic Divergence , US Foreign Policy , US-Israel Relations , 2026 War , Regional Security , Geopolitical Balances , Political Pathways , International Alliances

Abstract

This paper examines the structural divergence between the US and Israeli strategies during the joint military operations against Iran in February 2026. The study builds upon the core problematic of the "Alliance Security Dilemma." It highlights the stark contradiction between Tel Aviv's pursuit of a "zero-sum war" aimed at dismantling and balkanizing the Iranian regime, and Washington's pragmatic approach, which employed "coercive diplomacy" to force a political settlement and avert catastrophic repercussions on global energy security and the global economy. The analysis explores how Tehran capitalized on this strategic rift by deploying a "comprehensive deterrence" strategy within the gray zone, ultimately compelling the alliance to accept the April 2026 truce. The paper concludes that the lack of congruent ultimate objectives between Washington and Tel Aviv generated operational friction that hindered decisive military victory.

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Author Biography

Dr. Jaouad El Kassemi

PhD in Public Law and Political Science, and Visiting Professor at Mohammed V University - Rabat, Morocco.

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Published

07/01/2026

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

El Kassemi, J. (2026). Strategic Divergence Between Washington and Tel Aviv in Managing the 2026 War: Regional Dimensions and Trajectories. Ibn Khaldoun Journal for Studies and Researches, 6(7). https://doi.org/10.56989/benkj.v6i7.1980